“Permissive” Interests and the (Moral) Power of Consent.A Critique of David Owens

Authors

  • Matías Parmigiani CONICET/UNC/UES21

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.5347/isonomia.v0i53.224

Keywords:

permissive interests, justification, consent, Owens, personal reasons

Abstract

The aim of this paper is to criticize David Owens’ theory on the (moral) power of consent. According to this theory, the power of consent must be analyzed in terms of a distinctive normative interest, which would consist in permitting certain obligations to be breached, no matter what materially follows from that, like the transgression of some of our non-normative interests. Here I will argue that Owens’ theory would unfairly conflate two sets of considerations: a first set, relative to our general power to consent; and a second set, relative to the exercise of that power in certain particular occasions. In order to understand the first set, the theory can still be useful. Nonetheless, in order to understand the second one, the most reasonable step would be to appeal to the idea of personal reasons for action, an idea that does not seem to have received much attention in the established literature on consent.

References

Alexander, Larry, 1996: “The Moral Magic of Consent (II)”. Legal Theory, vol. 2, núm. 3, pp. 165-174.

Banakas, Stathis, 2009: “Liability for Contractual Negotiations in English Law: Looking for the Litmus Test”. InDret. Revista para el análisis del derecho, vol. 1, pp. 1-21.

Barnett, Randy, 1992: “The Sound of Silence: Default Rules and Contractual Consent”. Virginia Law Review, vol. 78, núm. 4 pp. 821-911.

Bennett, Christopher, 2015: “A Review of David Owens’ Shaping the Normative Landscape”. Jurisprudence. An International Journal of Legal and Political Thought, vol. 6, núm. 2, pp. 364-370.

Beyleveld, David y Brownsword, Roger, 2007: Consent in the Law. Oxford y Portland, Hart Publishing.

Dannenberg, Jorah, 2015: “People of Our Word”. Jurisprudence. An International Journal of Legal and Political Thought, vol. 6, núm. 2, pp. 357-363.

Estlund, David, 2008: Democratic Authority. A Philosophical Framework. Oxford, Princeton University Press. Citado por la traducción castellana de Linares, Sebastián: La autoridad democrática, Buenos Aires, Siglo Veintiuno Editores, 2011.

Hurd, Heidi, 1996: “The Moral Magic of Consent”. Legal Theory, vol. 2, núm. 2, pp. 121-146.

Kleinig, John, 2018: “Paternalism and Consent”, en Müller, Andreas y Schaber, Peter (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of the Ethics of Consent. Oxon y New York, Routledge, pp. 140-152.

Koch, Felix, 2018: “Consent as a Normative Power”, en Müller, Andreas y Schaber, Peter (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of the Ethics of Consent. Oxon y New York, Routledge, pp. 32-43.

Markovitz, Daniel, 2015: “Authority, Recognition, and the Grounds of Promise”. Jurisprudence. An International Journal of Legal and Political Thought, vol. 6, núm. 2, pp. 349-356.

Müller, Andreas, 2018: “Moral Obligations and Consent”, en Müller, Andreas y Schaber, Peter (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of the Ethics of Consent. Oxon y New York, Routledge, pp. 119-130.

Nino, Carlos S., 1983: “A Consensual Theory of Punishment”. Philosophy and Public Affairs, vol. 12, núm. 4, pp. 289-306.

Nino, Carlos S., 1992: “Réplica a María Inés Pazos”. Doxa. Cuadernos de Filosofía del Derecho, vol. 12, pp. 371-373.

Nino, Carlos S, 2007: Ética y derechos humanos. Buenos Aires, Astrea.

Owens, David, 2011: “The Possibility of Consent”. Ratio (new series), vol. XXIV, núm. 4 (diciembre), pp. 402-421.

Owens, David, 2012: Shaping the Normative Landscape . Oxford, Oxford University Press.

Parmigiani, Matías, 2019: “Beneficencia, consentimiento y magia moral. ¿Una propuesta kantiana?”. Revista Portuguesa de Filosofía, vol. 75, núm. 1, pp. 339-374.

Parmigiani, Matías, 2020: “El alcance justificatorio del consentimiento tácito. El problema de Locke y la lógica del beneficio”. Doxa. Cuadernos de Filosofía del Derecho, vol. 43, pp. 103-132.

Pazos, María Inés, 1992: “El principio de autonomía de la persona en el discurso moral: análisis de un argumento pragmático”. Doxa. Cuadernos de Filosofía del Derecho, vol. 12, pp. 353-370.

Pereda, Carlos, 2004: “Lógica del consentimiento”, en Olivé, León (compilador), Ética y diversidad cultural. México D. F., Fondo de Cultura Económica, pp. 102-129.

Raz, Joseph, 1987: “Rights and Individual Well-Being”, en Raz, Joseph, Ethics in the Public Domain: Essays in the Morality of Law and Politics. Oxford, Clarendon Press. Citado por la traducción castellana de Melón, María Luz: “Independizar a los deberes”, en Raz, Joseph, La ética en el ámbito público. Barcelona, Gedisa, 1994, pp. 42-56.

Scanlon, Thomas M., 1998: What We Owe to Each Other. Cambridge (Massachusetts), The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.

Schaber, Peter, 2018: “Consent and Wronging a Person”, en Müller, Andreas y Schaber, Peter (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of the Ethics of Consent. Oxon y New York, Routledge, pp. 55-64.

Tadros, Victor, 2016: Wrongs and Crimes. Oxford, Oxford University Press.

Vázquez, Rodolfo, 2008: “Educación liberal y democrática”, en Hoyos Vázquez, Guillermo (ed.), Filosofía de la educación. Madrid, Editorial Trotta, pp. 207-228.

Von Wright, Georg Henrik, 1963: The Logic of Preference. Edimburgo, Edinburgh University Press. Citado por la traducción castellana de Roberto J. Vernengo, La lógica de la preferencia. Buenos Aires, Editorial Universitaria de Buenos Aires, 1967.

Walker, Tom, 2018: “Consent and Autonomy”, en Müller, Andreas y Schaber, Peter (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of the Ethics of Consent. Oxon y New York, Routledge, pp. 131-139.

Published

2020-10-31

How to Cite

Parmigiani, M. (2020). “Permissive” Interests and the (Moral) Power of Consent.A Critique of David Owens. Isonomía - Revista De teoría Y filosofía Del Derecho, (53). https://doi.org/10.5347/isonomia.v0i53.224

Issue

Section

Research Articles