Legitimate Proof and Truth in Criminal Proceedings II

Epistemic Dependence of Proof


  • Gabriel Pérez Barberá National university of Cordoba




proof, truth, belief, acceptance, conceptual connection, epistemic necessity, retributive justice, rule of law


In this paper I try to show that there is a connection (which may well be considered conceptual) of epistemic necessity between proof and truth. It means that it is not possible, in criminal proceedings, to justifiably believe or to accept that it is proven that p if, from public but extraprocedural information, the judge knows that p is (probably) false. However, this presupposes that certain conditions are met, namely: first, that we are talking about a criminal trial which is legitimate in terms of the rule of law; and second, that we understand truth as the correspondence between a statement and the objective world. This is the main thesis and it is developed in this second part of my investigation. But it has support in some secondary assumptions, which were already analyzed in the first part of this paper, published in this volume as well.



How to Cite

Pérez Barberá, G. (2020). Legitimate Proof and Truth in Criminal Proceedings II: Epistemic Dependence of Proof. Isonomía - Revista De teoría Y filosofía Del Derecho, (52), 31–62. https://doi.org/10.5347/isonomia.v0i52.282



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