Legitimate Proof and Truth in Criminal Proceedings I

Metaphysical Independence of Truth


  • Gabriel Pérez Barberá Profesor de derecho penal




proof, truth, justificación, conceptual connection, metaphysical independence, retributive justice, rule of law


In this paper I try to show that, given certain conditions, there may be a connection (which may well be considered conceptual) of epistemic necessity between proof and truth. This is the main thesis, which is developed in the second part of my research, published in this volume as well. But it has support in some secondary assumptions, which are exposed and supported here in the first part. The most relevant ones are: it is not correct to interpret Tarski’s formula as a sophisticated definition of the correspondentist notion of truth; truth, in theoretical discourses, is an objective and attainable parameter depending on which justification disputes can be settled provisionally and based on reasons; there is a conceptual connection between truth and retributive justice; although that is usually not made explicit, what matters is the connection between legitimate proof and truth; truth does not imply justification; proof implies justification; epistemic justifications can collapse when confronted with truth.



How to Cite

Pérez Barberá, G. (2020). Legitimate Proof and Truth in Criminal Proceedings I: Metaphysical Independence of Truth. Isonomía - Revista De teoría Y filosofía Del Derecho, (52), 5–29. https://doi.org/10.5347/isonomia.v0i52.173



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