Interés general y regulación económica

Authors

  • Pablo Larrañaga Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México

Abstract

The main claims of this paper are 1) that standard market failure theories (MFT) of economic regulation is both systemically and normatively weak and 2) that the notion of general interest is a pivotal idea for the construction of a strong and inclusive theory of market regulation. MFT is systemically weak in that it fails to give account of the conflicting rationale for market regulation (e.g. economic regulation vs. social regulation) and is normatively feeble because it is unable to ground the regulatory activity on strong normative principles, i.e. reconciling efficiency and justice goals within the theory. Taking the notion of general interest as the bedrock of the theory of regulation it is possible to define regulation as the social activity of structuring voluntary exchange. In doing so, we focus on the social and normative identity of markets, without having to assume neither methodological (e.g. competitive equilibrium, rationality, perfect information, etc.) nor metaphysical presuppositions (e.g. social welfare).

Published

2007-10-31

How to Cite

Larrañaga, P. (2007). Interés general y regulación económica. Isonomía - Revista De teoría Y filosofía Del Derecho, (27), 73–109. Retrieved from https://isonomia.itam.mx/index.php/revista-cientifica/article/view/381

Issue

Section

Research Articles