¿Debería ser delito sobornar a un funcionario público? Un análisis consecuencialista
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.5347/isonomia.v0i54.423Keywords:
active bribery, decriminalization, consequentialism, empirical studiesAbstract
Should it be a Crime to Bribe a Public Officer? A Consequentialist Approach
The paper analyzes the approach that promotes the decriminalization of the behavior of offering bribes as a way to deter the acceptance of bribes by public officers. In general, this proposal is based on the argument that, if active bribery is not a crime, due to the fear of being reported by the bribers, from the beginning, officers would refrain from requesting or accepting the payment of bribes. After discussing different theoretical and empirical studies on the problem, it is argued that while in some cases decriminalization of active bribery is convenient, in others there are reasons to expect that it would be a counterproductive measure, since it would lead to an increase in both the offer and acceptance of bribes.
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