Expresivismo metajurídico, enunciados internos y aceptación plural

una exploración crítica

Authors

  • Pablo A. Rapetti Universitat de Girona

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.5347/47.2017.46

Keywords:

Expressivism, internal legal statements, acceptance, disagreements

Abstract

Metalegal Expressivism, Internal Statements and Plural Acceptance: A Critical Examination

One of the most profoundly debated issues in recent legal philosophy has been that of the ways in which to account for the phenomenon of disagreement among legal practitioners and among jurists when it comes to elucidating the content of the law and to, therefore, finding legal answers to particular controversies. Deriving from Ronald Dworkin’s work, this issue has become the instrument for an intense critical re-examination of legal positivism and has consequently spurred several jurisprudential approaches trying to account for the phenomenon in a way consistent with the central positivistic tenets. One of those approaches, in particular, intends to face the challenge by linking legal positivism to an expressivist analysis of first order legal discourse; an analysis analogous to that proposed for moral discourse by important authors in contemporary metaethics. In this paper I introduce the main features of this jurisprudential approach, inquiring into both some of its virtues and of its major difficulties.

Published

2017-11-30

How to Cite

A. Rapetti, P. (2017). Expresivismo metajurídico, enunciados internos y aceptación plural: una exploración crítica. Isonomía - Revista De teoría Y filosofía Del Derecho, (47), 39–80. https://doi.org/10.5347/47.2017.46

Issue

Section

Research Articles