La disputa entre positivismo excluyente e incluyente desde una perspectiva Neokantiana-Kelseniana

Authors

  • Mario García Berger Universidad Autónoma de la Ciudad de México

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.5347/43.2015.73

Keywords:

positivism, law, morals, normativism, legal science, Neokantism, Kelsenian jurisprudence, legal practice, value-judgments, conceptual schemes

Abstract

An Analysis of the Dispute between Exclusive and Inclusive Legal Positivism from a Neokantian-Kelsenian Perspective

The core purpose of this paper is to show that the exclusive-inclusive legal positivism debate is based on at least three erroneous ideas about the relation between legal and moral language, the relations between legal theory and legal practice, and the understanding of what a normative science is. Then, assuming the Neokantian-Kelsenian conception of jurisprudence, I propose the thesis that the legal language and the theory of law are, respectively, the conceptual foundations of moral language and legal practice. I also reject the idea that normative sciences embrace value-judgments. As a consequence, the debate between inclusive and exclusive legal positivism must be abandoned or, at the least, recasted.

Published

2015-10-31

How to Cite

García Berger, M. (2015). La disputa entre positivismo excluyente e incluyente desde una perspectiva Neokantiana-Kelseniana. Isonomía - Revista De teoría Y filosofía Del Derecho, (43), 77–96. https://doi.org/10.5347/43.2015.73

Issue

Section

Research Articles