El concepto de interés legítimo y su relación con los Derechos Humanos

Observaciones críticas a Ulises Schmill y Carlos de Silva

Abstract

The Concept of Legitimate Interest and its Relation to Human Rights: Critical Remarks on Ulises Schmill and Carlos de Silva

This work presents a critique of Ulises Schmill and Carlos Silva Nava's interpretation of the concept of legitimate interest. The first part of the critique identifies serious problems in the doctrinal tradition that combines Ihering’s concept of “legal interest” with the Kelsenian notion of subjective right, which has been influential in Mexican courts’ case law. The second part of the critique argues that the authors do not take into account the recent normative context that emerged in Mexico with the human rights reform. The author then proposes an interpretation of the notion of “legitimate interest” that is compatible with Article 1 of the Constitution, relative to human rights. This interpretation implies the abandonment of the traditional doctrine.