Sobre la estabilidad y fuerza categórica del republicanismo de Pettit
Keywords:
republicanism, stability, categorical force, freedom as non-domination, common goodAbstract
John Rawls and Ronald Dworkin have highlighted two requirements any normative political conception needs to meet. The former has stressed the importance of stability; the latter, that of categorical force. I argue that even though the republicanism defended by Philip Pettit, focused on the promotion of freedom as nondomination, may provide an answer to the problem of stability, it fails to achieve categorical force. Moreover, if we consider Pettit's recent revision of the stance he held in Republicanism regarding the cases in which the State is authorized to pursue the common good, his republicanism thus revised then fails even to meet the stability requirement.
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