Justicia y legitimidad en la ética discursiva

Los derechos fundamentales como intereses generalizables no excluyentes

Abstract

Cristina Lafont has criticized Jürgen Habermas, idea of justice because of discursive ethics’ rejection to consider some “moral facts” that transcend justifi cation and historical agreements. For this reason she believes that discursive ethics sacrifi ces its objectivism and cognitivism. Lafont proposes to include the notion of every man’s generalizable interests as a factual presupposition in all justifi cation practices. This would indicate participants what are they looking for at each time. Beyond Lafont this paper makes a distinction between the above mentioned practices of justifi cation and decision-making procedures, and proposes to link the idea of fundamental rights to that notion of generalizable interests. We try to respond the question for the juridical and historical conditions of political decisions’ legitimacy.