Sobre los presupuestos morales de la interpretación intencional
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.5347/61/2024/734Keywords:
morality and law, legal normativity, legal interpretation, rule of lawAbstract
On the Moral Assumptions of Intentional Interpretation
This paper defends the thesis that the interpretation of legislated law should be aimed at identifying the communicative intentions of its author (the relevant legislative body). The foundation lies in the fact that legislating and interpreting are activities that only make sense if they are recognized as the continued exercise of a collaborative agency, based on shared responsibilities and the need to respond to common reasons, which is made possible by the normative nexus provided by the rule of law and the moral purposes that justify it. As long as the institutional order meets the minimum requirements identified by the standpoint of autonomous agency and authorities satisfy the expectation that they will act in response to reasons, there is a moral obligation for those involved in legal practice to identify the changes that legal statutes introduce in law based on the intentions of their creators.
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