Sobre los presupuestos morales de la interpretación intencional
DOI :
https://doi.org/10.5347/61/2024/734Mots-clés :
morale et droit, interprétation juridique, normativité juridique, État de droitRésumé
Sur les présupposés moraux de l'interprétation intentionnelle
Cet article défend la thèse selon laquelle l'interprétation du droit législatif doit viser à identifier les intentions communicatives de son auteur (l'organe législatif pertinent). Ce fondement repose sur l'idée que légiférer et interpréter sont des activités qui n'ont de sens que si elles sont reconnues comme l'exercice continu d'une agence collaborative, basée sur des responsabilités partagées et sur la nécessité de répondre à des raisons communes. Cela est rendu possible par le lien normatif fourni par l'État de droit et les objectifs moraux qui le justifient. Tant que l'ordre institutionnel respecte les exigences minimales identifiées du point de vue de l'agence autonome et que les autorités répondent à l'attente qu'elles agiront en réponse à des raisons, il existe une obligation morale pour les participants à la pratique juridique d'identifier les modifications que les lois apportent au droit en se référant aux intentions de leurs créateurs.
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