Legal Positivism as a Theory of Law’s Existence
A Comment on Margaret Martin’s "Judging Positivism"
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.5347/isonomia.v0i55.487Palavras-chave:
Raz, positivismo jurídico , jurisprudência descritiva, existência de direito, conteúdo jurídico , investigações explicativas , investigações doutrináriasResumo
O Positivismo Jurídico como Teoria da Existência do Direito: Um Comentário a Judging Positivism de Margaret Martin
Este comentário examina criticamente a concepção de positivismo jurídico que informa o desafio interessante e multifacetado de Margaret Martin contra a substância e o método dessa tradição intelectual. A minha afirmação central é que sua caracterização da teoria substantiva do positivismo jurídico deixa de lado uma dimensão anterior mais fundamental e explicativa sobre a teoria positivista da existência de sistemas jurídicos e normas jurídicas. Também argumento que a sua leitura da metodologia descritiva positivista como um projeto não normativo é muito exigente e negligencia quer as relações entre direito e moral reconhecidas pelos positivistas jurídicos contemporâneos quer a distinção central entre investigações internas e externas. Esses esclarecimentos fornecem recursos para começar a abordar algumas das objeções de Martin contra o projeto Raziano.
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