Razonabilidad e incertidumbre en los estándares de diligencia
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.5347/isonomia.v0i55.471Keywords:
generic standards of care, indertermination, legal certainty, freedom, personal safetyAbstract
Reasonableness and Uncertainty in Standards of Care
It is a widespread belief that generic standards of care are a major source of uncer-tainty because they are radically indeterminate. In order to promote legal certainty, tort law should eradicate them as far as possible and favor specific standards, expressed in a very precise language. In this paper I argue that generic standards are not as indeterminate as it is usually assumed and that, in addition, they play a fundamental normative role in the practice of tort law by supplementing the precautions required by specific standards, which in turn enhances the protection of personal indemnity.
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