Razones jurídicas, lógica y determinación normativa
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.5347/61/2024/745Keywords:
legal statements, conclusive reasons, legal gaps, deontic logicAbstract
Legal Reasons, Logic and Normative Determinacy
Joseph Raz argues that legal statements are logically stratified. At the basic level are legal statements of reasons for action, and all other legal statements (e.g., permissions, rights, duties, competences, etc.) must be explained by their logical relations with the elemental form of legal statements. This idea is one of the keys to Raz's response to Dworkin's argument against legal positivism, at least in the version presented by Dworkin in his work on the thesis of the right answer in law. In this response, Raz unfolds the rudiments of the logic of conclusive legal reasons and, based on this formal development, argues that the law lacks genuine gaps. In this paper, I intend to (i) analyze some formal aspects of Raz's response to Dworkin's challenge to legal positivism, (ii) use the logic of norms and the logic of normative propositions developed by Alchourrón and Bulygin as a benchmark for comparison with the logic of conclusive reasons, and (iii) demonstrate in what sense the logic of conclusive reasons cannot guarantee the completeness of legal systems.
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