Can Disgust Predict Legal Decision-Making?
An Experimental Jurisprudence Perspective on Gut Feelings and the Rule of Law
DOI :
https://doi.org/10.5347/61/2024/758Mots-clés :
Rationalisation a posteriori, État de droit, raisons excluantes, dégoûtRésumé
Le dégoût peut-il prédire la prise de décisions juridiques ? Une perspective de jurisprudence expérimentale sur les émotions viscérales et l'État de droit
Dans cet article, nous nous demandons si la théorie du raisonnement moral développée par Jonathan Haidt peut être utilement adaptée pour éclairer certains aspects du raisonnement juridique. Selon l’intuitionnisme social de Haidt, le raisonnement moral est incapable de contrôler nos intuitions morales. Le raisonnement moral n’est qu’une rationalisation a posteriori d’intuitions formées de manière indépendante. Mais, le contrôle est-il rétabli lorsque nous passons du domaine moral au domaine juridique ? Pouvons-nous contrôler l’application des normes juridiques ou bien nos jugements juridiques, tout comme nos jugements moraux, sont-ils le résultat de l’influence déformante des intuitions ? Pour explorer cette question, nous tenterons de développer et de discuter un protocole expérimental centré sur le rôle du dégoût dans la prise de décisions fondée sur des règles. Nous chercherons à illustrer une méthodologie qui peut éclairer la psychologie du respect des règles, en discutant ses prémisses théoriques et méthodologiques.
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