Can Disgust Predict Legal Decision-Making?
An Experimental Jurisprudence Perspective on Gut Feelings and the Rule of Law
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.5347/61/2024/758Parole chiave:
Razionalizzazione ex post, Stato di diritto, ragioni escludenti, disgustoAbstract
Il disgusto può predire le decisioni giuridiche? Una prospettiva di giurisprudenza sperimentale sulle emozioni viscerali e lo Stato di diritto
In questo articolo ci chiediamo se la teoria del ragionamento morale sviluppata da Jonathan Haidt possa essere utilmente adattata per illuminare alcuni aspetti del ragionamento giuridico. Secondo l’intuizionismo sociale di Haidt, il ragionamento morale non è in grado di controllare le nostre intuizioni morali. Il ragionamento morale non è altro che una razionalizzazione ex post di intuizioni formatesi in modo indipendente. Ma il controllo si recupera quando passiamo dall’ambito morale a quello giuridico? Possiamo controllare l’applicazione delle norme giuridiche o i nostri giudizi giuridici, come i giudizi morali, sono il risultato dell’influenza distorsiva delle intuizioni? Per esplorare questa questione, tenteremo di sviluppare e discutere un protocollo sperimentale incentrato sul ruolo del disgusto nella presa di decisioni basata sulle regole. Cercheremo di illustrare una metodologia che possa chiarire la psicologia del rispetto delle regole, discutendo i suoi presupposti teorici e metodologici.
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