La teoría comunicativa de la interpretación jurídica en los sistemas jurídicos constitucionalizados.
Críticas teóricas y empíricas
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.5347/isonomia.58/2023.658Keywords:
legal interpretation, communication theory, legislative intent, constitutionally oriented interpretation, content of law, Jeffrey GoldsworthyAbstract
The Communication Theory of Legal Interpretation in the Constitutionalised Legal Systems. Theoretical and Empirical Critiques
This essay aims to critically examine the so-called communication theory of legal interpretation. Such theory, which is very widespread, claims that there is no relevant difference between ordinary conversation and legal interpretation, since both are ways of understanding an intentional communication. In particular, according to this theory, just as the content of an ordinary conversation is constituted by the speaker’s communicative intention, so the content of law is determined by the legislators’ communicative intentions. After briefly introducing the communication theory and the reasons behind it (§2), I will examine the theoretical criticisms that have been raised against it (§3), how its proponents react to those criticisms by modifying some elements of the theory, and whether such adjustments are sufficient to overcome the criticisms (§4). Then I will formulate an empirical critique against the communication theory in its various versions. I will argue that this theory is false –it does not provide a true description of legal interpretative practice– with respect to some legal systems –the constitutionalised legal systems (§5). Finally, I will briefly mention the consequences that the falsity of this theory yields with respect to some essential values of democratic states (§6).
References
Bobbio, Norberto, 1971: “Le bon législateur”. Logique et analyse, 14, pp. 243-249.
Borg, Emma, 2004: Minimal Semantics. Oxford-New York, OUP.
Canale, Damiano, 2017: “What Inferentialism Tells Us About Combinatory Vagueness in Law”, in Poggi, Francesca, Capone, Alessandro (eds.), Pragmatics and Law. Practical and Theoretical Perspectives. Cham, Springer, pp. 43-66.
Canale, Damiano y Poggi, Francesca, 2019: “Pragmatic Aspects of Legislative Intent”. The American Journal of Jurisprudence, 64(1), pp. 125-138.
Cappelen, Herman y Lepore, Ernest, 2005: Insensitive Semantic. Oxford, Blackwell.
Diciotti, Enrico, 1999: Interpretazione della legge e discorso razionale. Torino, Giappichelli.
Dworkin, Ronald, 1986: Law’s Empire. Cambridge, Harvard University Press.
García Jaramillo, Leonardo y Benítez Rojas, Vicente F., 2018: “El control judicial le cuesta demasiado a la democracia. Entrevista a Jeremy Waldron”. Isonomía, 48, pp. 171-182.
Goldsworthy, Jeffrey, 2019: “The Real Standard Picture and How Facts Make Law: a Response to Mark Greenberg”. The American Journal of Jurisprudence, 64(2), pp. 163-211.
________, 2013: “Legislative Intention Vindicated?”. Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 33, pp. 821–842.
Greenberg, Mark, 2011a: “Legislation as Communication? Legal Interpretation and the Study of Linguistic Communication”, in Marmor, Andrei y Soames, Scott (eds.), Philosophical Foundations of the Language in the Law. Oxford, OUP, pp. 217-264.
________, 2011b: “The Standard Picture and Its Discontents”. In Green, Leslie y Leiter, Brian (eds.), Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Law. Oxford, OUP, pp. 39-106.
________, 2014: “The Moral Impact Theory of Law”. Yale Law Journal, 123, pp. 1288-1342.
Guastini, Riccardo, 2004: L’interpretazione dei documenti normativi. Milano, Giuffrè.
________, 2008: Nuovi studi sull’interpretazione. Roma, Aracne.
________, 2011: La sintassi del diritto. Torino, Giappichelli.
Hägerström, Axel, 1953: Inquiries into the Nature of Law and Morals. Uppsala, Almqvist & Wiksells boktr.
Luzzati, Claudio, 2016: Del giurista interprete. Torino, Giappichelli.
Kutz, Christopher, 2000: “Acting together”. Philosophy and Phenomemological Research, 61, pp. 1-31.
Marcianò, Valeria G.F., 2005: “Le ordinanze di manifesta inammissibilità per “insufficiente sforzo interpretativo”: una tecnica che può coesistere con le decisioni manipolative (di norme) e con la dottrina del diritto vivente?”. Giurisprudenza costituzionale, 50, pp. 785-812.
Morelli, Marco, 2005: “L’interpretazione adeguatrice delle norme di legge e l’extrema ratio del sindacato di costituzionalità”. Nuova rassegna, 19-20, pp. 2149-2150.
Olivecrona, Karl, 1939: Law as Fact. Copenhagen, Munksgaard.
________, 1971: Law as Fact, 2nd ed. London, Steven & Sons.
Parodi, Gianpaolo, 2008: “Seguito giurisdizionale delle decisioni costituzionali interpretative ed additive di principio ed elementi di ‘diffusione’ nel controllo di costituzionalità”. Rivista trimestrale di diritto pubblico, 3, pp. 821-849.
Perry, John, 1998: “Indexicals, Context and Unarticulated Constituent”, in Aliseda, Atocha, van Glabbeek, Rob y Westerstahl, Dag (eds.), Computing Natural Language. Stanford, CSLI Pubblications, pp. 1-11.
Poggi, Francesca, 2020a: “Against the conversational model of legal interpretation”. Revus, 40, pp. 9-26.
Poggi, Francesca, 2020b: Il modello conversazionale. Pisa, ETS.
Posner, Richard A., 1983: “Statutory Interpretation – in the Classroom and in the Courtroom”. University of Chicago Law Review, 50, pp. 800-822.
Raz, Joseph, 2009: Between Authority and Interpretation. Oxford, OUP.
Recanati, François, 2004: Literal meaning. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
Ríos Alvarez, Lautaro, 2010: “El control difuso de Constitucionalidad de la Ley en Chile y en otros países de América”. Revista de Derecho de la Pontificia Universidad Católica de Valparaíso, 23, pp. 417-443.
Scalia, Antonin, 2018: A matter of interpretation. Princeton, Princeton University Press.
Scott, Allison W. 2011. Legal Interpretation: Taking Words Seriously. Claremont College, CMC senior theses.
Slack, Michelle R., 2006: “Avoiding Avoidance: Why Use of the Constitutional Avoidance Canon Undermines Judicial Independence. A Response to Lisa Kloppenberg”. Case Western Reserve Law Review, 56, pp. 1057-1069.
Slocum, Brian C., 2018: “Replacing the Flawed Chevron Standard”. William and Mary Law Review, 60, pp. 195-266.
Sorrenti, Giusi, 2014: “La interpretación conforme a la Constitución en el ordenamiento italiano: estado de la cuestión”. InDret, 2, pp. 1-20.
Tarello, Giovanni, 1980: L’interpretazione della legge. Milano, Giuffrè.
Troper, Michel, 1999: “Una teoria realista dell’interpretazione”. Materiali per una storia della cultura giuridica, 29, pp. 473-494.
Velluzzi, Vito, 2013: Le Preleggi e l’interpretazione. Pisa, ETS.
Waldron, Jeremy, 1999: Law and Disagreement. Oxford, OUP.
Downloads
Published
How to Cite
Issue
Section
License
Copyright (c) 2023 Isonomía - Revista de teoría y filosofía del derecho
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License.
ITAM, the publisher, has the copyright of published articles and remaining types of publications. Publications are in open access and licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License. That means, among other things, that authors can freely share their articles, once published in Isonomía, on their personal web pages, Academia.edu, etc.. Between formal acceptance and online publication, authors can share the final drafts of their articles. In contrast, authors must seek permission to reproduce or reprint work, and mention, in the first footnote, "previously published in Isonomía, year, n. x, pp. xx-xx"..
