Dos visiones de la democracia deliberativa desde el prisma del constitucionalismo democrático
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.5347/61/2024/688Keywords:
epistemic conception of democracy, deliberation, public reason, constitutionalism, reasoned consensusAbstract
Two Visions of Deliberative Democracy Through the Prism of Democratic Constitutionalism
The purpose of this article is twofold. It pursues to contrast two visions of deliberative democracy, and, simultaneously, it aspires to find good reasons at each stage of the contrast in order to defend one of them as the one that best meets the requirements of democratic constitutionalism. The two visions are, on the one hand, the epistemic deliberative democracy, which focuses on the deliberative democratic procedure as a sure guide for the identification of the right political decisions, and, on the other hand, the constitutional public reason, which insists on including the jurisdictional control of the constitutionality of laws as an integral and indispensable part of the democratic ideal. The comparative study is developed in three stages. It starts with the two views on the question of the legitimacy of the constitution as the supreme norm of the community’s legal and political order. Later, the contrast comes to the question of the constitutional legitimacy of political decisions taken through a deliberative democratic procedure. Finally, the study concludes in the realm of institutional design with the two views on legitimate judicial review of legislation.
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