Analogía e interpretación teleológica. Un caso aragonés
¿palas eólicas como ramas?
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.5347/isonomia.v0i53.416Keywords:
analogy, economic analysis of law, extensive interpretation, nuisance from branches and roots, ratio legis, teleological interpretationAbstract
Analogy and Teleological Interpretation. A Case from Aragon: Wind Blades as Branches?
The work presents a civil case (on wind blades as branches) where the need to clarify the ratio legis of a piece of legislation is shown to determine the legitimacy of its analogical application. This means that the analogical argument requires a teleological interpretation of the pertinent normative texts, to determine the ratio of a law and then proceed to a possible analogical integration of the system. To the extent that teleological interpretation serves not only to determine the content of a text in light of its underlying reason, but also to determine the reason itself, teleological interpretation is necessary for analogy. At the same time, the work shows how the use of the ratio is controversial and that second-degree legal arguments (such as the argument from economic consequences) can solve the most problematic cases.
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