Autoría e inteligencia artificial generativa: presupuestos filosóficos de la función del autor

Abstract

Authorship and Generative Artificial Intelligence: Philosophical Assumptions of the Function of the Author

Recent developments in generative artificial intelligence pose challenges to traditional legal concepts, one of which is authorship. The problem addressed by this paper is how to conceive the authorship of a work written by a generative artificial intelligence in which human intervention, in matters of style and content, is zero or minimal. For this, recent cases are listed in which this problem arises from articles written using this type of technology. But the goal of this paper is the revision of the conception of authorship that underlies the international norms that regulate intellectual property and the ethical assumptions that justify them (Locke’s conception, the romantic conception and the utilitarian conception). Based on a reading of Michel Foucault’s “What is an author?”, it is argued that the notion of authorship fulfills a social function that, at least to the state of the art of generative artificial intelligence, it cannot be fulfilled by it and, therefore, generative artificial intelligence should not be recognized as the author of the mentioned works. Concluding that literary works produced by multipurpose generative artificial intelligence with little or no human intervention should be considered as works in the public domain.